Marc Moquette
Knowledge envoy China for the central government
The initiative to establish the China Knowledge Network comes from the 2019 Cabinet memorandum “The Netherlands-China: A New Balance. The network aims to meet the growing need for knowledge and awareness of China within the central government. The Netherlands and China have a broad and intensive relationship, economically, politically and scientifically. The Dutch government encounters China as an important player on many themes in the international domain, whether it is climate and energy transition, trade policy, strategic dependencies, human rights, planetary health or key technologies. China also poses challenges on national issues such as our economic and national security and preserving the rule of law. Within the network, China experts contribute to a better understanding of China’s world vision, motives and policy strategies from different perspectives through research reports, master classes, seminars and briefings. This contributes to effective and well-aligned national policies. Since 2023, all 12 ministries of the central government have been actively involved in this cooperation. Their mutual cooperation increases the shared understanding of China and also the realization that less fragmented cooperation within the central government is needed to properly understand and help manage the complex policy challenges in the relationship between the Netherlands and China.
The rise of China prompted the central government to adopt radical new policies and a different way of aligning policies. As outlined in the Cabinet Note “Towards a New Balance” (2019), China capacity at ministries was strengthened. An independent and substantial China unit was created at the Ministry of Foreign Affairs and interdepartmental policy alignment was intensified…. BZ also took a step forward by establishing and funding the China Knowledge Network. In this network, ministries and China experts work together to establish a solid knowledge base under China policy. The Clingendael Institute and the Leiden Asia Centre form the secretariat. A China Knowledge Envoy and a network coordinator work internally with all ministries. As the network’s core team, they link the knowledge demand to the knowledge supply. Last year, this network reached the point of active participation by all 12 ministries. They decide collegially on the research direction. All ministries submit proposals and vote on programming; a unique practice of knowledge cooperation in central government.
Spread, coverage and creativity
The number of proposals from ministries and the academic network is increasing, as is the quality, creativity and coverage of the studies. The counter now stands at 25 published studies. The spread of topics is wide. Among them are, for example, area studies on the Western Balkans, Arctic space and Latin America; studies on critical dependencies on semiconductors, photonics, energy and raw materials; studies on experiences of the Chinese minority in the Netherlands; studies on the position and strategy of companies in the Netherlands, Europe and Asia; research on European frameworks for maritime-logistics hubs and research on cooperation on planetary health. We expect to release another dozen or so this year. Among them are studies on the internationalization of China’s currency, on tech standards and on the development of Chinese civil society in the Netherlands and Europe. All publications can be found at www.chinakennisnetwerk.nl. A few recent studies are briefly highlighted in the boxes accompanying this article.
Undercurrents
In addition to policy research, the network organizes thematic sessions for government and co-government officials, a China masterclass and networking days. The publication Undercurrents deserves a separate mention. This collection of essays is devoted to undercurrents in the relationship between the Netherlands and China that are barely considered in policy considerations. For example, historian Vincent Chang wonders with some irony whether there are better ways to debunk Chinese truth claims than by setting up an EU portal for disinformation in which anything that deviates from European “correct history” is flagged. And professor of globalization studies Jeroen de Kloet makes the point that Chinese identities are already as fluid as our own. The essays remind policymakers and diplomats that to understand our relationship with China, we must also look at ourselves. That can’t hurt in today’s zeitgeist of increasing polarization.
Relational gaze
Not a day goes by without press reports about existential challenges facing the Netherlands and Europe. The rivalry between the U.S. and China is taking frightening forms, Europe’s security guarantee is in jeopardy in U.S. politics, the monetary system and its debt production are becoming unsustainable, the Russians are in Ukraine, and the EU is divided among itself over energy, foreign policy and defense cooperation. Europe is now reinventing itself as a war economy as it de-industrializes and its competitiveness deteriorates. Meanwhile, in many countries, the government’s ability to outline a beckoning perspective for citizens is waning and social relations are becoming more polarized. Europe must take care of its economic security, manufacturing and competitiveness. Not only is China challenging Europe, the relationship with the U.S. and emerging countries is changing in character. We therefore need to understand not only China well, but especially how these developments relate to each other in our relationship. This requires not only objective knowledge but also a relational view. International challenges are often symptoms of supra-national, systemic challenges that we either learn to manage through cooperation or grow over our heads collectively. At its core, this cooperation revolves around caring for the livability of the earth and turning a linear, extractive relationship between humans and nature into a circular, regenerative relationship. This requires a politics that relieves pressure on natural resources and our social and ecosystems. These complex challenges can only be managed if even the unlike-minded start working together and each acknowledges being part of the challenge themselves.
Inflection point
All these developments cut across our relationship with China and make it complex. It is not enough to understand China better; we must also scrutinize our relationship with China in our research, and that also means looking more closely at ourselves. Complexity cannot be out-analyzed in, say, an economic model or a geopolitical narrative, even though these auxiliary sciences dominate our policies. Our relationship with China has reached a turning point / inflection point ? reached: Both countries can only stand up for their self-interest by standing up for a shared systemic interest. Diplomatic and policy interventions that serve too strictly self-interest without taking into account those shared, systemic dependencies yield superficial, local and short-term benefits at best. And they simultaneously reduce self-resilience. This is happening now, both in China and in the Netherlands. The conversation about these shared systemic dependencies does not get off the ground sufficiently, because governments are mostly afraid of the imbalance in the state system itself and their relative position. For example, someone like Jeffrey Sachs signals the collapse of diplomacy between the U.S. and Russia and between the U.S. and China. He argues that the US is now content merely to declare Russia and China untrustworthy, so that it is no longer even worth negotiating. This is bad news for Dutch economic and social resilience, which is therefore visibly declining.
Fragmentation and complexity
A shared concern for these shared systemic dependencies is tentatively developing within the China Knowledge Network. This transcends any individual ministry. If we do not want to disappear sleepwalking into a self-fulfilling prophecy of systemic rivalry, the central government itself must also get to work. The state of current knowledge cooperation in central government can do a good job of solving surveyable problems that lend themselves to clear analysis from established disciplines. But that is no longer sufficient in our relationship with China. The report Knowledge Rich Cooperation, commissioned by the twelve secretaries general, identifies two mutually reinforcing flaws in knowledge cooperation in the central government: excessive fragmentation in academia and administration and an inability to address complex policy challenges. The China Knowledge Network is working to expand its observational horizon and look for ways to face complex policy challenges head-on. Fail to do so sufficiently, and the central government itself risks harming the public interest.
Shared perceptual horizon
Such research also touches on other like-minded and unlike-minded countries that we sometimes can no longer reach or convince diplomatically well. With them, too, it is necessary to develop a shared perceptual horizon for these systemic dependencies. This cannot be achieved by merely pointing out to others their wrong behavior, but requires mutual recognition that you yourself are part of the challenge. Even if parties in a relationship each see it in a very different way, as long as you apply this principle, you are in conversation. Successful processes of peace and reconciliation, where parties who were at each other’s throats in a civil war have to look ahead, show that despite existential differences in worldview and political ideology, you can work together to find a common course. In global diplomacy, including with China, the challenge is to develop that attitude of cooperation before rivalries and systemic dependencies become unmanageable. The China Knowledge Network wants to make a modest contribution to this by identifying knowns that lie outside the current knowledge horizon of the national government – and can sometimes be politically controversial – and giving them a place in politics and governance. This requires time and space for independent thinking, caring action and good cooperation across administrative boundaries – scarce competencies in a world where everyone is busy getting their own minister through the week. This year’s topics include energy transition, climate and the monetary system. These are no small issues. And in this, whether it wants to or not, the Netherlands itself is always part of the challenge.
